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BOND AND THE VIENNA RULES
Roger P. Alford*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has never followed the international approach to
treaty interpretation. In the over forty years since the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties1 was signed, the Supreme Court has not relied on its
interpretive methodology on a single occasion. This is despite the fact that
the Vienna Convention’s interpretive approach (the Vienna Rules) reflected
the common practice at the time it was adopted, and now reflects customary
international law. This is also despite the fact that the United States views the
Vienna Convention as the authoritative guide to treaty law and practice.
This is not to suggest that the Supreme Court does not utilize the same
interpretive tools as the Vienna Rules. Indeed, at one time or another the
Court has used every single interpretive tool reflected in the Vienna Rules.2
It supports reliance on the ordinary meaning of the terms of a treaty. It
recognizes that a treaty should be construed to give effect to its purposes. It
agrees that a treaty should be read in the context in which the written words
are used. It interprets terms in light of subsequent practice and agreements.
It supports recourse to supplementary means of interpretation such as the
negotiating history. It follows general rules of interpretation such as presumptions and constructions that follow ordinary logic and reason.
Although the Court has never systematically followed the holistic, unitary
approach of the Vienna Rules, it consistently relies on the same interpretive
tools.3
Bond marks an important moment in this history of Supreme Court
treaty interpretation. It is the first time that the Supreme Court has analyzed
a treaty using the same methodology as the Vienna Rules. That is, the Court
interpreted the treaty “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary mean© 2015 Roger P. Alford. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for International and Graduate Programs,
University of Notre Dame School of Law. J.D. New York University; LL.M. University of
Edinburgh.
1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
2 See infra Part III.
3 See infra Part III.
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ing to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose.”4 Because the terms of the treaty were ambiguous
and could lead to manifestly absurd and unreasonable results, the Court also
applied supplementary means of interpretation, including the negotiating
history and presumptions.5
Bond raises the possibility that the Court’s interpretive approach could
more closely align with the international standard. There already are
existing canons of construction that support a greater reliance on the Vienna
Rules. Among them is the general rule that treaties are contracts between
nations that should be interpreted according to a shared understanding. If
the shared expectations of the contracting parties is that treaty terms should
be interpreted according to the Vienna Rules, then it follows that the Court
could apply that canon not only to interpret the meaning of specific treaty
terms, but also to its interpretive methodology. Another canon of construction is that the Court should give deference to the executive branch’s interpretation of treaties. If the executive branch recognizes that the Vienna
Rules are the authoritative guide to treaty interpretation, then the Court
should give great weight to that conclusion.
In Bond, treaty interpretation saved a constitutional crisis. In the future
courts will likewise avoid the constitutional question of the scope of the treaty
power. That is because treaties are formed with federalism in mind. Sometimes that concern is express, either in the text of the treaty or according to
the reservations of Senate ratification. At other times, that concern is
implicit as a general rule of international law. Treaty interpretation of those
federalism limitations typically will lead courts to find that the federal government has not encroached on the inherent powers of the several states when
adopting treaties.
This Article briefly outlines the Court’s holding in Bond, and the general
framework of interpretation set forth in the Vienna Rules. It then looks at
Supreme Court jurisprudence that is consonant with the Vienna Rules. The
Article then analyzes Bond’s interpretive approach using the Vienna Rules
methodology. It concludes with reflections on the future of Supreme Court
treaty interpretation and how that interpretation could avoid reaching the
constitutional question of the scope of the treaty power.
I. BOND V. UNITED STATES
In Bond v. United States6 the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether legislation implementing a treaty prohibiting the use of chemical
weapons should be interpreted to reach “a purely local crime.”7 If it did, the
Court would revisit Missouri v. Holland8 and address the constitutional ques4 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1, art. 31.
5 Id. art. 32.
6 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
7 Id. at 2083.
8 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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tion of the scope of the treaty power. The Court never reached the second
question, finding that the statute implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention did not cover Bond’s conduct.9
The operative language of the Chemical Weapons Convention provides
that “[e]ach State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances: (a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain
chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to
anyone; [or] (b) To use chemical weapons.”10 The treaty defines
“[c]hemical [w]eapons” as “[t]oxic chemicals and their precursors, except
where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.”11 In
turn, a “[t]oxic [c]hemical” is defined as “[a]ny chemical which . . . can cause
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.”12 Purposes that are not prohibited include “[i]ndustrial, agricultural,
research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.”13 Congress
implemented the treaty by statute imposing the same prohibitions and using
the same definitions set forth in the treaty.14
The Bond majority held that the statute implementing the treaty should
be read consistent with federalism, and applying that background principle,
Congress did not clearly intend to intrude on the police power of the states
by reaching purely local crimes.15 The Court analyzed the ordinary meaning
of a “chemical weapon” in its context and in light of the object and purpose
of the treaty.16 The boundless and expansive reach of a broad definition of
“chemical weapon” rendered the term ambiguous, and required the Court to
consider the context from which the statute arose—a treaty about chemical
warfare and terrorism.17 “[T]he global need to prevent chemical warfare,”
the Court concluded, “does not require the Federal Government to reach
into the kitchen cupboard, or to treat a local assault with a chemical irritant
as the deployment of a chemical weapon.”18
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia interpreted a “chemical
weapon” solely on the basis of a textual analysis of the statutory definition.19
That definition defines a chemical weapon as a “toxic chemical” used for any
9 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2086–94.
10 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. I, opened for signature Jan. 13,
1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997)
[hereinafter CWC].
11 Id. art. II(1)(a).
12 Id. art. II(2).
13 Id. art. II(9)(a).
14 See Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 229–229F
(2012).
15 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087–90 (2014).
16 Id. at 2087–94.
17 Id. at 2090.
18 Id. at 2093.
19 Id. at 2094 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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manner other than “a purpose not prohibited.”20 A “toxic chemical is any
chemical which . . . can cause . . . permanent harm to humans or animals”
and a “purpose not prohibited” is “[a]ny peaceful purpose related to an
industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other
activity.”21 For Justice Scalia, the meaning of the statute was plain and applying it was uncomplicated: “Bond possessed and used ‘chemical[s] which . . .
can cause . . . permanent harm.’ Thus, she possessed ‘toxic chemicals.’ And,
because they were not possessed or used only for a ‘purpose not prohibited,’ . . . they were ‘chemical weapons.’ Ergo, Bond violated the Act.”22
Justice Scalia dismissed the Court’s other interpretive devices as “unintelligible.”23 Ordinary meaning is irrelevant when the statutory definition is
utterly clear.24 No court or commentator since Aristotle has ever suggested
otherwise.25 And interpreting the statute in light of the concerns driving the
treaty—acts of war, assassination, and terrorism—is simply an “illogical
embellishment” that will render it more difficult to apply.26
As usual, absent from the Court’s or concurring opinion’s discussion on
treaties was the definitive international standard for treaty interpretation.
The Court has never relied on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
to interpret treaties, and it did not do so in Bond. Unlike in the past, however, the Court’s methodology was coextensive with the international standard for treaty interpretation.
II. THE VIENNA RULES
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides the accepted
international law framework for interpreting treaty provisions. The Vienna
Convention’s rules on interpretation have become “the virtually indispensable scaffolding for the reasoning on questions of treaty interpretation.”27
Article 31 provides that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”28
“Context” is defined, among other things, as “the text, including its preamble and annexes.”29 Context also includes “[a]ny agreement relating to
the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty” and “[a]ny instrument which was made by one or more
20 Id. at 2094 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 229F(1)(A) (2012)).
21 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 229F(1)(A), (8)(A)).
22 Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
23 Id. at 2097.
24 Id. at 2096.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 2097.
27 Hugh Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960–1989:
Supplement, 2006: Part Three, 77 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 19 (2006).
28 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1, art. 31(1).
29 Id. art. 31(2).
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parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.”30
Supplementary means of interpretation, such as review of the travaux
préparatoire31 (negotiation history), are also permitted for limited purposes.
Article 32 provides that:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in
order to confirm the meaning . . . or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to article 31: (a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or
obscure; or (b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable.32

The fundamental idea behind these Vienna Rules is that the act of interpretation is analysis in pursuit of understanding. Only a holistic process that
combines numerous ingredients can achieve the correct result. Every term
in a treaty has a history, an intention, a location, and a goal. Terms have an
etymology of their own, and an origin as part of a negotiated instrument.
Terms are the tools that give expression to the parties’ intentions. Terms are
subunits of a much larger framework that includes, among other things, the
instrument, the section, the paragraph, and the sentence. Terms reflect the
parties’ teleology, and are the means to achieve the desired ends. Proper
interpretation requires analysis of each facet of the term.
The Vienna Rules could more aptly be described as the “Vienna Rule”
because “the process of interpretation is a unity” and Articles 31 and 32
“form a single, closely integrated rule.”33 The heading of Article 31—General
Rule of Interpretation—was deliberately written in the singular “rule” rather
than plural the “rules” to capture this intention.34 The idea is that the sum is
greater than the parts, and that a proper analysis of any text includes, inter
alia, context and purpose.
The Vienna Rules attempted to “codify the comparatively few general
principles which appear to constitute general rules for the interpretation of
treaties.”35 This does not mean, however, that other maxims or methods of
interpretation are inappropriate. The drafters understood the importance of
other principles such as contra proferentum or eiusdem generes in certain circumstances and authorized their use as “supplementary means” of interpretation
to confirm or determine the meaning of treaty terms.36
30 Id.
31 See Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 207 (2d Cir. 2008) (describing the Latin term
travaux préparatoire as “the interpretive effect of the negotiating and drafting history of a
treaty”).
32 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1, art. 32.
33 2 UNITED NATIONS, YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 220 (1966)
[hereinafter 1966 ILC YEARBOOK].
34 See id. at 219.
35 Id. at 218–19.
36 Id. at 219; see RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 311–12, 349–50 (2008).
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VIENNA RULES

The United States has never ratified the Vienna Convention, but it recognizes the treaty as “the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice.”37 On rare occasion, lower courts have expressly relied on the Vienna
Rules to interpret the terms of a treaty,38 but the Supreme Court has never
done so. Instead, the Court employs the same tools of treaty interpretation
as the Vienna Rules without invoking those rules. Indeed, the Court has utilized every single Vienna Rule at one time or another.
Consistent with Article 31(1),39 the Court on numerous occasions has
interpreted terms of a treaty according to their “ordinary meaning.”40 In
Santovincenzo v. Egan, the Court held that “[a]s treaties are contracts between
independent nations, their words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning
‘as understood in the public law of nations.’ ”41 In Medellı́n v. Texas, the
Court interpreted Article 94 of the U.N. Charter, under which “[e]ach Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the
[International Court of Justice] in any case to which it is a party,” as a commitment of the political branches to comply rather than an automatic and
binding directive directly applicable in domestic courts.42 Applying a “timehonored textual approach,” the Court found that the failure to use binding
language such as “shall” or “must” suggested the undertaking was a political
rather than a judicial commitment.43

37 S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 92-1, at 1 (1971); see Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 196 n.19
(2d Cir. 2008); Avero Belg. Ins. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 423 F.3d 73, 79 n.8 (2d Cir. 2005).
38 See Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 432–33 (2d Cir. 2001); Chubb &
Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 308–09 (2d Cir. 2000); Maria Frankowska, The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281,
327–54 (1988). The International Court of Justice (ICJ) also has described the Vienna
Rules of Interpretation as reflecting customary international law. See Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) 2004 I.C.J. 37 (Mar. 31); Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J.
43 (July 9).
39 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1, art. 31(1) (“A treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).
40 See, e.g., Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 92–96, (2005) (interpreting treaty
term “bay” according to the ordinary meaning mariners apply to that term); Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 655 (2004) (interpreting treaty terms “under the ordinary
and usual definitions of these terms”); Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S.
176, 180 (1982) (“The clear import of treaty language controls unless ‘application of the
words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the
intent or expectations of its signatories.’” (quoting Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49,
54 (1963))).
41 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) (quoting Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890)).
42 552 U.S. 491, 508–509 (2008) (quoting U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1).
43 Id. at 508, 514.
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Consistent with Article 31(1),44 the Court routinely interprets treaty
terms in light of the treaty’s object and purpose.45 The Court recognizes the
interpretive principle that “a treaty should generally be ‘construe[d] . . . liberally to give effect to the purpose which animates it.’ ”46 In Société Nationale
Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States District Court, the Court focused on the
purpose of the Hague Evidence Convention to “ ‘facilitate the transmission
and execution of Letters of Request’ and to ‘improve mutual judicial cooperation in civil or commercial matters.’ ”47 Such a purpose evinces no intent,
the Court concluded, to exclude all other transnational discovery
procedures.48
Consistent with Article 31(1),49 the Court frequently invokes context as
a tool of interpretation, particularly by reading a term in light of other treaty
provisions.50 “When interpreting a treaty, we ‘begin with the text of the
treaty and the context in which the written words are used.’ ”51 For example,
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court interpreted Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Convention in light of other provisions of that Convention and concluded that the phrase “conflict not of an international character” is to be

44 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1, art. 31(1) (“A treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).
45 El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 169 (1999) (discussing the
purpose of the Warsaw Convention); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer,
515 U.S. 528, 537 (1995) (“It would also be out of keeping with the objects of the Convention for the courts of this country to interpret COGSA to disparage the authority or competence of international forums . . . .”); Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 5 (1975)
(discussing the aim of the Shipowners’ Liability Convention).
46 United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 368 (1989) (quoting Bacardi Corp. of Am. v.
Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1940)); see Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293–94
(1933); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929); Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317,
331–32 (1912).
47 482 U.S. 522, 534–35 (1987) (quoting Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 23 U.S.T. 2555).
48 Id.
49 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1, art. 31(1) (“A treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).
50 Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 509 (2008) (interpreting Article 94(1) of the U.N.
Charter in light of Article 94(2)); Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 650 (2004)
(interpreting term “accident” in one treaty provision in light of the use of the term “occurrence” in another treaty provision); El Al Israel, 525 U.S. at 169 (examining treaty provision
in light of comprehensive scheme of liability created by the treaty); Zicherman v. Korean
Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 224 (1996); O’Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27, 31 (1986)
(interpreting one section of the Panama Canal Treaty in light of other sections of that
treaty).
51 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988) (quoting
Société Nationale, 482 U.S. at 534).
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interpreted in contradistinction to a conflict between nations.52 As such,
Common Article 3 encompasses not only civil wars, but also conflicts with
nonstate actors such as al Qaeda.
Consistent with Article 31(3)(a),53 the Court has considered subsequent
agreements between the parties as an interpretive aid.54 In INS v. CardozaFonseca, the Court interpreted the term “refugee” in light of the definition of
that term in two different treaties adopted over a period of fifteen years.55
The Court interpreted the term “refugee” in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in light of the 1967 United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, and found that a refugee
included any person who had a reasonable basis to fear persecution, rather
than a person who was more likely than not to be persecuted.56
Consistent with Article 31(3)(b),57 the Court has relied on the subsequent treaty practice of the parties to help establish the parties’ agreement as
to its meaning.58 In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., the Court
interpreted the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention in light of the parties’ subsequent practice, finding that “[t]he conduct of the contracting parties in implementing [the Convention] in the first 50 years of its operation
cannot be ignored.”59 Likewise, in Medellı́n, the Court looked to the “ ‘postratification understanding’ of signatory nations” and found that the absence
52 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628–31 (2006) (quoting Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135).
53 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1, art. 31(3)(a) (“There
shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) Any subsequent agreement
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its
provisions . . . .”).
54 Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405–08 (1985) (interpreting the Warsaw Convention in
light of the Montreal Agreement and Convention on Civil Aviation); Weinberger v. Rossi,
456 U.S. 25, 27–29 (1982) (comparing treaty provisions in 1947 and 1968 military base
agreements, as well as a dozen other such agreements that provided for preferential hiring
of local nationals on U.S. military bases located overseas).
55 480 U.S. 421, 436–40 (1987).
56 Id. at 429–41.
57 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1, art. 31(3) (“There shall
be taken into account, together with the context . . . (b) Any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation.”).
58 El Al Isr. Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 167 (1999) (“[W]e have traditionally considered as aids to [a treaty’s] interpretation . . . the postratification understanding of the contracting parties.” (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217,
226 (1996))); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 537
(1995) (“[W]e decline to interpret our version of the Hague Rules in a manner contrary to
every other nation to have addressed this issue.”); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 516 (1947)
(refusing to change the construction of treaty terms that had been consistently interpreted
since 1860); Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943) (“[W]e
may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the
practical construction adopted by the parties.”).
59 Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 260 (1984).
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of evidence that “any other country would treat [the International Court of
Justice’s] judgments as directly enforceable as a matter of its domestic law
strongly suggests that the treaty should not be so viewed in our courts.”60
Consistent with Article 31(3)(c),61 the Court has relied on relevant rules
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.62 In
Breard v. Greene, the Court interpreted a treaty obligation in light of a background international law norm recognizing that treaties are implemented
according to the procedural rules of the forum state.63 It also has refused to
apply international law norms that it viewed as inapplicable or irrelevant. In
United States v. Alvarez-Machain the Court analyzed customary international
law to interpret a bilateral extradition treaty and concluded that the norms
on which respondent relied do not relate “to the practice of nations in relation to extradition treaties.”64
Consistent with Article 31(4),65 the Court has recognized that departures from the ordinary meaning are appropriate if the parties so intended.66
In Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, the Court held that “[t]he clear
import of treaty language controls unless ‘application of the words of the
treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with
the intent or expectations of its signatories.’ ”67
Consistent with Article 32(a),68 the Court often considers the negotiating history when treaty terms are ambiguous.69 In Air France v. Saks, the
60 Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 516–17 (2008) (quoting Zicherman, 516 U.S. at
226).
61 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1, art. 31(3) (“There shall
be taken into account, together with the context . . . (c) Any relevant rules of international
law applicable in the relations between the parties.”).
62 Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29 (1982) (applying “principles of international
law” to interpret what constitutes a treaty); Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 6 (1975)
(stating that a treaty obligation is “declaratory of a longstanding tradition respecting the
scope of the shipowner’s duty to furnish injured seamen maintenance and cure”).
63 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam).
64 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 666–69 (1992).
65 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1, art. 31(4) (“A special
meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.”).
66 Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963) (“[I]t is particularly inappropriate
for a court to sanction a deviation from the clear import of a . . . treaty . . . when . . . there is
no indication that application of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signatories.”).
67 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982) (quoting Maximov, 373 U.S. at 54).
68 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1, art. 32 (“Recourse may
be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the
treaty . . . when the interpretation according to article 31 . . . [l]eaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure . . . .”).
69 El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 167 (1999) (“‘[W]e have
traditionally considered as aids to [a treaty’s] interpretation the negotiating and drafting
history (travaux préparatoires) . . . .’” (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Airlines Co., 516 U.S.
217, 226 (1996)); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989) (stating that
negotiation history may be “consulted to elucidate a text that is ambiguous”); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988) (“‘Treaties are construed
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Court noted that “[i]n interpreting a treaty it is proper, of course, to refer to
the records of its drafting and negotiation. . . . In part because the ‘travaux
préparatoires’ of the [treaty] are published and generally available to litigants,
courts frequently refer to these materials to resolve ambiguities in the text.”70
Likewise, in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court relied on the treaty’s
negotiating history to interpret whether a bilateral extradition treaty was the
exclusive means for gaining custody of a foreign national.71
Consistent with Article 32(b),72 occasionally the Court has refused to
interpret terms based on their plain meaning where doing so would lead to
an absurd or unreasonable result.73 In Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.,74
the Court refused to interpret the term “harm” based on the plain meaning
of that term because it would expose airlines to “tort liability beyond what
any legal system in the world allows, to the farthest reaches of what could be
denominated ‘harm.’ ”75
In sum, the Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that there is no
inconsistency between the Vienna Rules and the Court’s canons of treaty
interpretation. These cases, read together, support the proposition that the
Supreme Court has had recourse to all the interpretive tools employed by the
Vienna Rules. Even so, until Bond the Court has never engaged in the unitary approach anticipated by the drafters of the Vienna Rules that treats the
interpretive task as a single, comprehensive process.
IV. BOND

AND THE

VIENNA RULES

Bond is unique in that it is the only important example of a specific case
where the Supreme Court followed the Vienna methodology in its entirety.
Although it did not cite the Vienna Rules, the Court interpreted the Chemical Weapons Convention in “good faith in accordance with the ordinary
more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look
beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical
construction adopted by the parties.’” (quoting Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985));
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 416–17 (1984) (discussing negotiating history of the United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974) (discussing the negotiating history of a treaty); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294 (1933) (“In ascertaining the meaning of a treaty we may look
beyond its written words to the negotiations and diplomatic correspondence of the contracting parties.”); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 112 (1933) (“In construing the
Treaty its history should be consulted.”).
70 470 U.S. 392, 400 (1985) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
71 504 U.S. 655, 665–66 (1992).
72 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1, art. 32 (“Recourse may
be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the
treaty . . . when the interpretation according to article 31 . . . (b) [l]eads to a result which is
manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”).
73 O’Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27, 30–31 (1986) (rejecting petitioners’ “utterly
implausible” interpretation of the treaty).
74 516 U.S. at 222–25.
75 Id. at 222.
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meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.”76 It also used “supplementary means of
interpretation”—including the travaux préparatoire and common principles of
construction—to confirm the meaning of ambiguous treaty terms that otherwise could be interpreted to lead to absurd results.77
The Court had to overcome significant obstacles in reaching the conclusion that it did. Read literally, the statutory definition clearly appeared to
embrace Bond’s conduct. As Justice Scalia concluded in concurrence, Bond
did not have peaceful purposes in mind when she used a toxic chemical to
harm her husband’s mistress.78 She used a “chemical which . . . can cause
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.”79 Her purpose in using it was not peaceful and did not relate to
“industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activit[ies].”80
Thus, a straightforward reading of the prohibition would encompass her conduct. For Justice Scalia, such a reading was “simple,” “[u]navoidable,” and
“clear beyond doubt.”81
For the Court, such a reading was too broad to accept. It could not
imagine that the treaty was intended to have an effect so boundless that
kitchen cabinets were chemical weapons caches.82 Therefore, it resorted to
other interpretive aids, all of which were embodied in the Vienna Rules. The
Court followed the same reasoning as the drafters of the Vienna Rules, that
“[w]hen a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and the
other does not enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and
the objects and purposes of the treaty demand that the former interpretation
should be adopted.”83
The ordinary meaning of the term “chemical weapon” was central to the
Court’s analysis. “[A]s a matter of natural meaning, an educated user of
English would not describe Bond’s crime as involving a ‘chemical
weapon.’ ”84 The natural meaning of that term accounts for both the type of
chemical used and the circumstances in which they were used. No ordinary
person would consider that the chemical Bond used was a deadly toxin of the
type the Convention was designed to address. The ordinary meaning of a
“weapon” is “ ‘[a]n instrument of offensive or defensive combat.’ ”85 Using
76 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1, art. 31(1).
77 Id. art. 32.
78 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2094 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); see id. at 2102 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“By its clear terms,
the statute at issue in this case regulates local criminal conduct that is subject to the powers
reserved to the States.”).
79 18 U.S.C. § 229F(8)(A) (2012); CWC, supra note 10, art. II(2).
80 18 U.S.C. § 229F(7)(A).
81 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2094–95 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
82 Id. at 2093 (majority opinion).
83 1966 ILC YEARBOOK, supra note 33, at 219.
84 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2090.
85 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2589 (2002)).
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natural parlance, Bond’s behavior was not combat. Interpreting “chemical
weapon” to include Bond’s crime “would give the [implementing] statute a
reach exceeding [its] ordinary meaning.”86 Reliance on the ordinary meaning of “chemical weapon” plays a “limiting role” on the scope of the prohibition, and avoids transforming “a statute passed to implement the
[I]nternational Convention on Chemical Weapons into one that also makes
it a federal offense to poison goldfish.”87
The Court extensively discussed the object and purpose of the Convention. It began with an image of the ravages of chemical warfare during the
First World War as the impetus behind the overwhelming consensus that
toxic chemicals should never be used as weapons of war.88 It cited the bold
aspirations expressed in the Convention’s Preamble—the complete elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction used by state and nonstate
actors in times of war and peace.89 These purposes were critical to the
Court’s interpretation. “[T]he Convention’s drafters intended for it to be a
comprehensive ban on chemical weapons . . . [and] we have doubts that a
treaty about chemical weapons has anything to do with Bond’s conduct.”90
Given the purpose of the Convention to address “war crimes and acts of terrorism,” the Court concluded that “[t]here is no reason to think the sovereign nations that ratified the Convention were interested in anything like
Bond’s common law assault.”91 It found that Bond’s chemical of choice—an
arsenic-based compound that causes minor irritation when touched92—bore
“little resemblance to the deadly toxins that are of particular danger to the
objectives of the Convention.”93 The “purely local crime”94 that Bond committed “could hardly be more unlike the uses of mustard gas on the Western
Front or nerve agents in the Iran-Iraq war that form the core concerns of
[the] treaty.”95 Accordingly, the United States and the community of nations
have no interest in seeing Bond imprisoned for violating the ban on chemical weapons.96 The purpose behind the Convention served to underscore
the limited scope of the prohibition. “[T]he global need to prevent chemical
warfare does not require the Federal Government to reach into the kitchen
86 Id. at 2091.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 2083.
89 Id. at 2083–84.
90 Id. at 2087.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 2085.
93 Id. at 2090 (quoting Ian Kenyon, Why We Need a Chemical Weapons Convention and an
OPCW, in THE CREATION OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS 17 (Ian Kenyon & Daniel Feakes eds., 2007) [hereinafter THE CREATION OF THE
ORGANIZATION]) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94 Id. at 2083.
95 Id. at 2093.
96 Id.
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cupboard, or to treat a local assault with a chemical irritant as the deployment of a chemical weapon.”97
The Court also repeatedly cited context as an interpretive aid. It concluded that “the context from which the [implementing] statute arose demonstrates a much more limited prohibition was intended” by the ban on
chemical weapons.98 Rather than rely solely on the statutory definition, the
Court concluded that “the improbably broad reach of the key statutory definition” was rendered ambiguous by “the context from which the statute
arose—a treaty about chemical warfare and terrorism.”99 The Court interpreted the term “chemical weapon” in light of the entire Convention, including the Preamble, other treaty provisions, and the Annex on Chemicals.100
These provisions illuminated the purpose and structure of the ban on chemical weapons and the nature of the banned chemicals.
Most importantly, the Court twice cited Article VII, which provides that
“ ‘[e]ach State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt
the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Convention.’ ”101 These provisions illuminated the purpose and structure of the ban
on chemical weapons, and the nature of the banned chemicals.
When the Court again quoted Article VII saying that “ ‘[e]ach State Party
shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures
to implement its obligations under this Convention,”102 it cited this provision
as contextual support for a federalism presumption. The “constitutional process in our ‘compound republic’ keeps power ‘divided between two distinct
governments.’ ”103 Faithful to federalism and other constitutional concerns,
the Convention only required that “necessary measures” be adopted, leaving
to the states how they would be adopted within their constitutional system.104
This context permitted the Court to interpret the treaty obligation consistent
with a federalism presumption, a presumption that has a longstanding history within the Court’s jurisprudence.105
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 2090.
100 Id. at 2083–84, 2090 (discussing the Preamble, Articles I, II, VII, VIII, IX, and the
Annex on Chemicals).
101 Id. at 2084, 2087 (quoting CWC, supra note 10, art. VII(1)) (alteration in original).
102 Id.; see also id. at 2093.
103 Id. at 2093 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
104 Id. at 2087–88 (citing Lisa Tabassi, National Implementation: Article VII, in THE CREATION OF THE ORGANIZATION, supra note 93, at 207).
105 See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (“[T]reaties with foreign
nations will be carefully construed so as not to derogate from the authority and jurisdiction
of the States of this nation unless clearly necessary to effectuate the national policy.” (citing
Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 143 (1938)); Todok v. Union State
Bank, 281 U.S. 449, 455–56 (1930) (interpreting treaty to avoid inconsistency with state
homestead law).
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The Court also relied upon subsequent practice. In particular, the
Court noted that the United States had “identified only a handful of prosecutions that have been brought” under the statute, and they have almost invariably focused on “assassination, terrorism, and acts with the potential to
[create] mass suffering.”106 This subsequent practice underscored the
nature of the offense and limited its reach to purely local crimes. Consistent
with the Vienna Rules, this practice illuminated the meaning of the chemical
weapons ban.
Finally, with respect to supplementary means of interpretation, the
Court recognized that the definition for a “chemical weapon” was ambiguous
and that a broad reading would be absurd. The Court found that ambiguity
exists because of the “improbably broad reach” of the statutory definition
and “the deeply serious consequences of adopting . . . a boundless reading.”107 It is absurd to read a definition of chemical weapon so broadly that
“[a]ny parent would be guilty of a serious federal offense—possession of a
chemical weapon—when, exasperated by the children’s repeated failure to
clean the goldfish tank, he considers poisoning the fish with a few drops of
vinegar.”108 That, however, was the “inescapable conclusion” of a literal
reading of the statutory definition.109 To avoid a reading that would turn
every kitchen cupboard into a chemical weapons cache, the Court concluded
that one should employ other interpretive devices.
The two most important supplementary means of interpretation the
Court used were the treaty’s negotiating history and a federalism presumption. With respect to the Convention’s history, the Court traced its origins to
the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the desire “to expand the prohibition on
chemical weapons beyond state actors in wartime.”110 This history led the
Court to doubt that “chemical weapons” have anything to do with Bond’s
conduct. “The Convention, a product of years of worldwide study, analysis,
and multinational negotiation, arose in response to war crimes and acts of
terrorism. There is no reason to think the sovereign nations that ratified the
Convention were interested in anything like Bond’s common law assault.”111
The negotiating history confirmed that the object and purpose of the treaty
was not to punish purely local crimes.
The federalism presumption was the final and most important means of
supplementary interpretation. The Court described the federalism presumption as a principle embedded within the treaty itself, which authorized the
adoption of national measures “in accordance with its constitutional
processes.”112 As the Court put it, “[t]he Convention . . . is agnostic between
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2092.
Id. at 2090.
Id. at 2091.
Id.
Id. at 2084.
Id. at 2087 (citation omitted).
Id. (quoting CWC, supra note 10, art. VII (1)).
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enforcement at the state versus federal level.”113 “Congress legislates against
the backdrop of certain unexpressed presumptions,”114 among them the presumption that, absent a clear statement to the contrary, Congress did not
authorize “a stark intrusion into traditional state authority” such as dealing
with local criminal activity.115 The Court purported to apply the federalism
presumption only to the implementing legislation,116 but it then interpreted
both the treaty and the statute to exclude purely local crimes. The reason it
did so was because the statute was designed to give effect to the treaty and did
so using the same provisions and key definitions set forth in the treaty.
For the first time in history, the Court in Bond relied on all of the interpretive tools set forth in the Vienna Rules. Bond raises the possibility that
Supreme Court practice in interpreting treaties could more frequently conform to the international standard.
V. THE VIENNA RULES FOLLOWING BOND
The parallels between the Vienna Rules and the Court’s interpretive
approach in Bond are striking. Had the Court expressly referenced the
Vienna Rules and applied its methodology, the reasoning or result would not
have been different. In one sense this is not surprising because the Vienna
Rules simply codify maxims that for the most part are “principles of logic and
good sense.”117 If the goal of every interpretive endeavor is to give effect to
the intention of the parties, it is only reasonable to account for the factors
enumerated in the Vienna Rules. Looking at ordinary meaning of treaty
terms in their context and in light of the object and purpose is precisely what
one would expect a court to do even in the absence of the Vienna Rules.118
But, in another sense, it is truly remarkable that Bond represents the rare
case in which the Supreme Court has systematically examined the ordinary
113 Id. The Vienna Rules assume that supplementary rules of interpretation include
general principles of treaty interpretation such as presumptions. See Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1, art. 32.
114 Id. at 2088 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 449 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
115 Id. at 2094.
116 Id. at 2088 (“[W]e have no need to interpret the scope of the Convention in this
case. Bond was prosecuted under section 229, and the statute—unlike the Convention—
must be read consistent with principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional
structure.”).
117 1966 ILC YEARBOOK, supra note 33, at 218.
118 That is precisely what the ICJ and Permanent Court of International Justice did for
decades prior to the adoption of the Vienna Rules. See, e.g., Competence of the General
Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J.
4, 8 (Mar. 3) (“[T]he first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the
provisions of a treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary
meaning in the context in which they occur.”); Competence of the ILO to Regulate Agricultural Labour, Advisory Opinion, 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) Nos. 2–3, at 23 (Aug. 12) (“[I]t is
obvious that the Treaty must be read as a whole, and that its meaning is not to be determined merely upon particular phrases which, if detached from the context, may be interpreted in more than one sense.”).
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meaning of the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of the treaty’s
object and purpose. More commonly, the Court has articulated its interpretive task as beginning with the text and then considering the negotiating history and post-ratification practice.119
Bond may represent a watershed moment in which the Court’s interpretive approach closely aligns with the international standard. There is nothing
in Supreme Court jurisprudence that would prevent such an alignment.
Indeed, fundamental canons of interpretation support the notion that the
Supreme Court could align its interpretation approach with the international
standard.
One such principle is the idea that the Court recognizes that treaties are
“contract[s] between nations”120 that should be interpreted according to
“shared expectations.”121 In Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, the Court recognized
that “[a] treaty is in its nature a contract between . . . nations, not a legislative
act.”122 Therefore, “[i]t is our ‘responsibility to read the treaty in a manner
consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties.’ ”123 In
Abbott v. Abbott, the Court held that “[i]n interpreting any treaty, ‘[t]he opinions of our sister signatories . . . are entitled to considerable weight.’ ”124 In
Aérospatiale, the Court stated that “[i]n interpreting an international treaty,
we are mindful that it is in the nature of a contract between nations to which
general rules of construction apply.”125 Historically, the Court seeks to
understand the “shared expectations” of the contracting parties when interpreting specific terms of the treaty. But it also could employ this canon to
the methodology of interpretation itself.

119 See Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506–07 (2008); Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines
Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 365–66 (1989); Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1943).
120 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 253 (1984).
121 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 672 n.4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 299 (1985)); E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499
U.S. 530, 536 (1991) (citing Saks, 470 U.S. at 399); Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 533 (1987); Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. at 254, 260;
Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) (citing Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271
(1890)).
122 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1232–33 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Foster v. Neilson,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)).
123 Id. at 1233 (quoting Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 650 (2004)); see Saks,
470 U.S. at 399; see also Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence
and a Call for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1903 (2005) (“Indeed, a declaration of fidelity
to shared expectations has become near boilerplate in modern Supreme Court treaty
opinions.”).
124 560 U.S. at 16 (alteration in original) (quoting El Al Isr. Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng,
525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
125 482 U.S. at 533 (quoting Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. at 253 (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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The Vienna Rules now reflect the rules of customary international law
applicable to all treaties.126 In this sense every treaty includes an agreement
on interpretation. In some cases this agreement is explicit, such as the
United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, which obligates the parties to
“interpret and apply provisions of this Agreement . . . in accordance with
applicable rules of international law.”127 Likewise, the United States bilateral
investment treaties require arbitral tribunals “[to] decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules of international
law.”128 If the “shared expectations” of the parties is that the treaty should be
interpreted pursuant to the Vienna Rules, then the Supreme Court should
recognize the Vienna Rules under its existing jurisprudence. It would not do
so because the United States has ratified the Vienna Convention or because
the Vienna Rules are otherwise part of U.S. law. Rather, the Court would rely
on them because with every treaty the contracting parties have the expectation that the treaty terms will be interpreted using the Vienna Rules.
Another canon of construction that could support reliance on the
Vienna Rules is the deference the Court gives to the executive branch’s interpretation of treaties.129 In Abbott, the Court held “[i]t is well settled that the
Executive Branch’s interpretation of a treaty is entitled to great weight.”130
In Avagliano, the Court found that “[a]lthough not conclusive, the meaning
attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with
their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight.”131 In El Al
126 See GARDINER, supra note 36, at 7 (“The International Court of Justice . . . has pronounced that the Vienna rules are in principle applicable to the interpretation of all
treaties.”).
127 The United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, State
Dept. No. 04-35 (2003); see Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3(2), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (noting that the Members recognize that
the WTO’s dispute settlement system shall interpret the WTO agreements “in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law”); North American Free
Trade Agreement art. 1131, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 645 (1993) (“A Tribunal established
under this Section shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement
and applicable rules of international law.”).
128 See U.S. Department of State, 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 30,
available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf.
129 For commentary on the Court’s deference to executive interpretations of treaties,
see Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649 (2000);
Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723 (2007); Evan Criddle, Comment, Chevron Deference and Treaty
Interpretation, 112 YALE L.J. 1927 (2003); David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch
Treaty Interpretations: A Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497 (2007); Scott
M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty Interpretation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 777 (2008); Joshua Weiss, Defining Executive Deference in Treaty Interpretation Cases, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1592 (2011).
130 560 U.S. 1, 15 (2010) (quoting Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S.
176, 184 n.10 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
131 Avagliano, 457 U.S. at 184–85 (citing Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961));
see Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933).
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Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, the Court stated that “[r]espect is ordinarily due the reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the
meaning of an international treaty.”132
Ordinarily, this deference applies to the executive branch’s interpretation of specific treaty terms. But it could also support the executive branch’s
support for the Vienna Rules as the authoritative guide to treaty interpretation.133 The Foreign Affairs Manual recognizes the Vienna Convention as an
authoritative legal basis for negotiating and concluding treaties.134 The
United States routinely relies on the Vienna Rules in litigation before
national and international tribunals, including in briefs before the Supreme
Court.135 In one such brief, the United States recently informed the Court
that “[a]lthough the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, the United States generally recognizes the Convention as
an authoritative guide to treaty interpretation.”136 If the United States views
the Vienna Rules as the authoritative guide to treaty interpretation, and the
Supreme Court accords great deference to the executive branch’s interpretation of treaties, then the Court could rely on the Vienna Rules in deference
to the executive branch.
Traditionally these canons are viewed as in tension with one another,
with the former understood as an “internationalist” perspective and the latter
a “nationalist” perspective.137 But if the executive branch and the shared
expectation of the contracting parties all recognize that the Vienna Rules are
the accepted framework for treaty interpretation, then the two canons support one another.
VI. THE VIENNA RULES

AND THE

TREATY POWER

Treaty interpretation saved a constitutional crisis. Had the Court
addressed the Treaty Power, there was much fear and trepidation that it
132 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999).
133 See S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 92-1, supra note 37, at 1; see also 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. III, intro. note, at 144–45 (1987)
(discussing Vienna Convention’s codification of the customary international law governing
international agreements and the acceptance of the Convention by the United States).
134 11 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 712 (2014).
135 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Vacatur and Remand at
17, BG Group PLC, v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014) (No. 12-138), 2013 WL
4737184, at *17; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9
n.6, Abbott, 560 U.S. 1 (No. 08-645), 2009 WL 3043970, at *9 n.6; Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 24, Sanchez-Llamas v. Johnson, 548
U.S. 331 (2006) (Nos. 05-51, 04-10566), 2006 WL 271823, at *24. For examples of U.S.
reliance on the Vienna Rules before international tribunals, see GARDINER, supra note 36,
at 17.
136 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9 n.6, Abbott,
560 U.S. 1 (No. 08-645), 2009 WL 3043970, at *9 n.6.
137 David Sloss, United States, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT 504, 524 (David Sloss ed., 2009) (“The canon of deference to the executive branch is
the nationalist counterpoint to the transnationalist canon of good faith.”).
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would have limited the federal government’s power to adopt treaties that
encroached on the reserved powers of the several states. Three Justices writing in concurrence reached that question, and concluded that the treaty
power had federalism limitations.138
Henceforth, the Court likely will avoid the constitutional question in
other treaty contexts as well because most treaties could be interpreted either
expressly or implicitly to embrace federalism limitations.139 If Bond counsels
courts to undertake a treaty analysis before reaching the constitutional question,140 and treaties typically expressly or implicitly recognize federalism limitations, then courts will rarely need to opine on the scope of the treaty
power.
Only national governments are entitled to enter into treaties, but in the
United States, like many federal systems, only sub-federal units are capable of
implementing key treaty obligations that address traditional state functions.141 Accordingly, signatories in federal systems adopt treaties consistent
with constitutional limitations. The process of treaty formation routinely
addresses federalism concerns. One could say that it is an established principle of international law that states are permitted to adopt and implement
treaties subject to federalism limitations. Consistent with the Vienna Rules,
the Supreme Court could invoke this principle of international law, either as
part of the context,142 as a “relevant rule[ ] of international law,”143 or as a
“supplementary means of interpretation.”144
The most common way for federalism limitations to be reflected in
treaty formation is through reservations, understandings, and declarations
(RUDs). Ordinarily the United States accomplishes the federalism limitation
entirely through RUDs. The Senate routinely includes federalism and constitutional RUDs when ratifying a treaty.145 For example, the Senate under138 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2094 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 2102 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2111 (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
139 For examples of treaties that do not seek to accommodate federalism concerns, see
Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power,
79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1371–72 (2006). With such treaties, federalism is “simply not an
issue” or they relate to “foreign persons or transnational conduct.” Id. at 1371.
140 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2087 (“[I]t is a ‘well-established principle governing the prudent
exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction that normally the Court will not decide a constitutional
question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case.’” (quoting
Escambia Cnty. v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984))).
141 Syméon Karagiannis, The Territorial Application of Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO
TREATIES 305, 313–14 (Duncan Hollis ed., 2012) (“[M]any federal States’ constitutions
entitle their federal sub-federal governmental units . . . to implement . . . the measures
necessary for the federal State to comply with a treaty.”).
142 Assuming, for example, there was a treaty clause addressing federalism concerns as
was the case in Bond.
143 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1, art. 31(3).
144 Id. art. 32.
145 See, e.g., S. Res. of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the U.N. Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime, 151 Cong. Rec. S11,334 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2005);
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standing included in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
provided that “the United States understands that this Covenant shall be
implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments.”146 Under the Vienna Rules, a RUD
is part of the treaty context, as an “instrument which was made by one or
more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty.”147
A federalism RUD was not an option in the Chemical Weapons Convention context because the treaty prohibited the use of reservations.148 Consequently the treaty included a clause that addressed federalism concerns.
Article VII filled the role that a federalism reservation would otherwise play
by authorizing signatories to implement the treaty in a manner consistent
with their constitutional obligations.149 The Court described the treaty as
“agnostic” as to whether the treaty was enforced at the state or federal
level.150 That agnosticism was quite intentional.
The Chemical Weapons Convention is an example of a treaty that explicitly incorporated constitutional concerns. Other treaties go further and reference not only constitutional concerns but also explicitly incorporate
federalism into the treaty. “Federal state clauses” avoid the “strains created
by the confrontation between international and federal national law.”151
They do so by obligating the national government to take action to the
extent national law grants legislative jurisdiction to the federal government,
but then the treaty obligates the federal government to recommend sub-federal entities to take such measures at the state and local levels. Examples of
treaties with a “federal state clause” include The New York Convention, the
Constitution of the International Labour Organization, the Tobacco ConvenS. Res. of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 Cong. Rec. S7634 (daily ed. June 24, 1994); S. Res. of
Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992); S. Res. of Advice and Consent to
Ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 136 Cong. Rec. S17491 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
146 S. Res. of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. S4784 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
147 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1, art. 31(2)(b).
148 CWC, supra note 10, art. XXII.
149 Compliance with constitutional obligations was addressed during this and other
arms control treaty negotiations. In particular, the constitutional concerns of warrantless
searches of weapons of mass destruction was raised during the negotiations and served as
an impetus for the drafters to include the language on “constitutional processes” set forth
in Article VII. The Constitutionality of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Prepared Testimony
Before the Subcomm. on Constitution, Federalism, and Prop. Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. 33–41 (1996) (Statement of Barry Kellman, Professor, Depaul University College of Law); David A. Koplow, Arms Control Inspection: Constitutional Restrictions on Treaty
Verification in the United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 229, 297–335 (1988).
150 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014).
151 Karagiannis, supra note 141, at 315.
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tion, and the Convention on Cybercrime.152 With such treaties, courts will
not face the constitutional question of whether the federal government
exceeded the treaty power because express provisions of the treaty will be
interpreted to avoid the federalism concerns.
The political branches’ concerns for federalism are reflected in treaty
formation. Treaties are drafted consistent with federalism limitations. In
Bond, seven former legal advisers for the U.S. State Department noted that
“[t]he executive and legislative branches already undertake great efforts to
account for domestic laws and policies—including federalism—throughout
the treaty-making and implementation process.”153 The Senate ratifies treaties with federalism RUDs. Treaties are implemented in light of federalism
concerns. Therefore, when courts interpret treaties, they do so presuming
that the prerogatives of state powers will be preserved. As in Bond, this presumption should avoid the need to address the constitutional issue of the
scope of the treaty power.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has long ignored the Vienna Rules. Bond does not
change that fact, but it does give support for courts to rely on the interpretive
tools that form the basis for the Vienna Rules. The Court has always
accepted the tools of interpretation reflected in the Vienna Rules. It now has
accepted those tools as part of a holistic, unitary approach. The Vienna
Rules are hidden behind the veil of Bond’s interpretative methodology. Consistent with accepted canons of construction, the Court could rely on the
Vienna Rules more explicitly. The Court could also rely on the Vienna Rules
to avoid constitutional questions. As in Bond, interpreting treaties as incorporating federalism limitations will often avoid the constitutional question of
the scope of the treaty power.

152 THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES, supra note 141, at 719–23; Hollis, supra note 139,
at 1377.
153 Brief of Former State Department Legal Advisers as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 20, Bond, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (No. 12-158), 2013 WL 4518602, at *20.
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